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Byron Davies
Of the contributors to this symposium, I am the newest to Stanley 
Cavell, both to the transformational power of his work and to the trans-
formational power of his friendship. I thus want to start by saying how 
humbled I am to be a part of this occasion, which is the largest stage I 
have yet enjoyed as an aspiring philosopher. I first met Stanley Cavell 
in March 2009, in my first year of graduate school, when a friend and 
I invited him to join our first-year class at a performance of Beckett’s 
Endgame in Cambridge. Knowing something of the Cavell voice from 
his essay on the play (which I had come upon accidentally in college), 
but as yet knowing nothing of his devotion to young philosophers, 
I was giddy for weeks when he not only accepted our invitation, but 
suggested that we meet for drinks both before and after the play. It was 
a beautiful evening, and the next day Stanley sent all of us an email 
announcing that he had woken up with a smile on his face, “as if the 
performance we attended was rather of something called Openings.” 
Those openings widened sooner than I expected, when several months 
later (having spent much of the semester obsessively reading The Claim 
of Reason in a group organized by my teacher Richard Moran, whose 
role in my understanding of Stanley’s work will become apparent) I 
learned that the Walter M. Cabot Professor, Emeritus, was looking 
for a research assistant. To borrow a phrase from Little Did I Know: I 
might as well have been asked if I would care to visit Paradise (137). 
It’s a job I unhesitatingly (though very nervously) took up, and it’s 
one that I have relished ever since. I cannot express how grateful I 
am now to this wonderful man and his wonderful family, particularly 
his wife Cathleen, for their support during this period (this period 
which has included the editing and publication of Little Did I Know). 
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But I do want to note (and here I think I speak representatively) how 
important visits to their home in Brookline, Massachusetts, can be 
for restoring sanity and humanity. My afternoons with Stanley and 
Cathleen Cavell have been the best kind of philosophical education, 
the best kind of personal education, the best kind of therapy, and the 
best kind of companionship.
It should thus not be surprising that today I want to say something 
about themes of companionship, especially as they appear in Stanley 
Cavell’s earliest work (and the reception of ordinary language phi-
losophy in that work) and as they appear in Little Did I Know. At the 
very beginning of his memoir, Cavell notes that he has been here 
before, not only in earlier autobiographical writing such as A Pitch 
of Philosophy, but also in his early understanding of the methods of 
J.L. Austin and the later Wittgenstein as autobiographical, specifi-
cally in their insistence that “I speak philosophically for others when 
they recognize what I say as what they would say, recognize that their 
language is mine,” and he notes that this has produced in him an 
understanding of philosophical writing as “the autobiography of a 
species” (6). So Cavell is returning to one of the animating questions 
of his earliest work, namely what entitles one to say ‘we’, what entitles 
one to speak on behalf of others. This is the question that opens the 
essay “Must We Mean What We Say?”, written in response to a paper 
by his then-Berkeley colleague Benson Mates disputing the entitle-
ment of ordinary language philosophers (in this case, Austin and 
Ryle) to make claims about what we say (in this case, what we say is 
done “voluntarily”) because they have not assembled the right kind 
of evidence. Cavell’s response was to claim that such native speakers 
do not need evidence about “what we say”: they are the source of that 
evidence (Must 4).
Connected with this is Cavell’s insistence that the methods of 
Austin and Wittgenstein (including methods of asking “What should 
we say if . . .”, or “In what circumstances would we call . . .”) are 
methods for arriving at self-knowledge (Must 66). But philosophical 
writing on self-knowledge, particularly in analytic philosophy of the 
twentieth and twenty-first centuries, has focused almost entirely on 
knowledge of one’s own mental states, such as one’s own beliefs and 
pains; whereas Cavell’s animating question is how private reflection 
can implicate not just oneself, but also other people. Nevertheless, the 
best of contemporary philosophical writing on self-knowledge shares 
with Cavell a concern for overcoming estrangement, whether an 
estrangement from one’s own attitudes or an estrangement from 
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one’s own words. Here I have in mind Richard Moran’s 2001 book 
Authority and Estrangement, and its insistence upon the inadequacy of 
merely being told by my analyst that I resent my neighbor: until I can 
see something in that resentment, until I can look to the world and 
see my neighbor’s snide jokes as warranting resentment, until I can 
avow that attitude, “there is still work to be done” (31). Similarly, I 
can be told by my teachers (as well as by bullies) what we say around 
here, but until I can look to the world and see someone’s shooting a 
donkey as an accident rather than a mistake (as Austin asks us to do 
in his paper “A Plea for Excuses”), until I can avow the words of my 
community, I will find myself alone and confused. This is at least part 
of the significance I attach to Cavell’s remarks that “the philosophy 
of ordinary language is not about language, anyway not in any sense 
in which it is not also about the world,” and that “ordinary language 
philosophy is about whatever ordinary language is about” (Must 95).
So I am claiming that internal to Cavell’s understanding of ordinary 
language philosophy as a method for arriving at self-knowledge is an 
understanding of it as a method for avowing one’s words, for over-
coming alienation from one’s community. And we can now see part 
of the ordinary language philosopher’s inheritance from Socrates. 
For at the end of “Must We Mean What We Say?” Cavell writes, “by 
searching definitions Socrates can coax the mind down from self-
assertion . . . and lead it back, through the community, home” (43). 
But we know that Socratic questioning (“What do we call piety?” “In 
what circumstances do we call something just?”) can leave us feel-
ing estranged from our words (familiar as the aporia felt at the end 
of a Platonic dialogue, when we find that after all we didn’t know, 
or couldn’t articulate, what we call piety) and also of course feeling 
estranged from our community (despite Socrates’ efforts to adhere to 
the laws of Athens even when put to death). But I think we can also 
now see what the ordinary language philosopher finds dissatisfying 
about Socrates’ specific way of asking Socratic questions. For if it turns 
out that searching for definitions consistently leaves us feeling alone 
and confused, then perhaps we should not draw the conclusion that 
that feeling is always warranted, but rather that (and I think this is 
the conclusion characteristic of ordinary language philosophy) there’s 
something wrong with always searching for definitions. Thus we have 
Austin and Wittgenstein’s attention to particular stories, to particular 
contexts of assertion, eliciting judgments about “what we say” only 
about those specific cases. Home is a specific place, and we can’t get 
there from any or every road. (Incidentally, in Little Did I Know Cavell 
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writes that it was in his days in Berkeley student theater that he both 
“found a home” and seriously began to fix his attention on the specific 
contexts in which something is said [214, 217].)
I think what so many of us find refreshing and important about 
Cavell’s early defense of ordinary language philosophy is its conceiv-
ing of knowledge of “what we say” not just in terms of entitlement (as 
Benson Mates had done), but also in terms of responsibility: knowing 
what we say, coming to avow our words, is something that’s expected 
of us. Unless I can speak representatively, I can’t mean what I say. Or 
as Cavell writes in The Claim of Reason: “The alternative to speaking for 
myself representatively . . . is not: speaking for myself privately. The 
alternative is having nothing to say, being voiceless, not even mute” 
(28). Here again it is illuminating to read Cavell together with con-
temporary philosophical writing on self-knowledge. In Authority and 
Estrangement Moran similarly conceives of one’s attitudes not just as 
things one is entitled to know, but also as things one is responsible for 
knowing, things one can speak for. This is why relying upon empirical 
evidence or another’s testimony to know one’s own beliefs, expecta-
tions, or desires strikes us as a kind of evasion. (“Do you intend to pay 
the money back?” Moran has someone ask in an imaginary dialogue. 
“As far as I can tell, yes.”1) Whenever I take this kind of empirical stance 
upon myself, I refuse to make up my mind. Thus, consistently taking 
this kind of stance upon oneself is both unhealthy and unsustainable.
If something similar is true of knowledge of “what we say,” then 
that should account for what seems so dangerous and wrongheaded 
about an early critique of Cavell, Jerry Fodor and Jerrold Katz’s 1963 
paper “The Availability of What We Say.” (In Little Did I Know Cavell 
registers lythe enormous hurt this paper caused him upon his return 
to the East Coast from Berkeley [442, 491].) Fodor and Katz argued 
that the mere possibility of being wrong about “what we say” (a pos-
sibility Cavell of course allowed for in his writing) showed that it is 
always a good idea to advert to empirical evidence (such as what a 
field linguist might gather about some community’s use of a word) to 
1“We do not only allow [someone’s] statement to stand without the benefit of evi-
dence, we also expect and sometimes insist that he take himself to be in a position to 
speak for his feelings and convictions, and not simply offer his best opinion about them. 
(‘Do you intend to pay the money back?’ ‘As far as I can tell, yes.’) And it is part of 
this same demand that not only do we not expect the person to need to his base his 
statement on evidence, but we may regard his deferring to the behavioral evidence as 
a form of evasion, or else as suggesting that the state of mind he’s reporting on cannot 
be a fully rational one” (Moran 26).
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know what we say.2 But to know what we say by relying on empirical 
linguistic evidence (looking upon one’s linguistic community rather 
than outward to the world) is as much an evasion of a responsibility 
as my relying upon behavioral evidence (looking upon myself rather 
than outward to the world) to know whether I intend to pay the money 
back. I can take the stance that Fodor and Katz advocate upon any 
linguistic community—not just one whose words I avow.
It may be harder for us to imagine someone waiting to speak—wait-
ing to declare something ‘an accident’ rather than ‘a mistake’—until 
the right kind of linguistic evidence has come in, and Fodor and Katz 
might take that (charitably) as showing the unavailability of the right 
evidence, or (uncharitably) as a sign of our intellectual laziness. But 
I think it shows that taking this kind of stance upon what we say is 
even more unmanageable than taking it upon one’s own attitudes. 
Consistently deferring to linguistic evidence about what we say leaves 
a speaker without anything to say (at least with conviction). And if 
this stance is manageable, it at least seems (by asking us to shirk our 
responsibility to avow our words, by asking us to approach our own 
linguistic community as outsiders) unhealthy. (I think this was part of 
Cavell’s insight to connect the inability to speak on behalf of others 
with certain pathologies. Fodor and Katz may have unwittingly painted 
themselves as Cavell’s neurotic, who “has reason, and the strength, to 
keep what he means from himself” [Must 67]. The neurotic may be 
in fact correct, but—because he came to know what we say without 
meaning what he says—he is “in soul muddled” [The Claim 180].)
I now want to say a bit more about how these themes from Cavell’s 
early writing get developed in Little Did I Know (and thus, I hope, 
something of their source in Cavell’s life). In the opening chapters of 
the book Cavell registers his feeling of childhood homelessness (one 
result of his family’s move from the South to the North Side of Atlanta, 
and of their frequent moves between Atlanta and Sacramento), and we 
begin to understand his later occupation with the Augustine passage 
that opens Philosophical Investigations, and in particular Wittgenstein’s 
claim that “Augustine describes the learning of human language as if 
[he had come] into a strange country” (§32). Again and again Cavell 
finds himself in communities whosewhere there are words he does 
2“[Cavell’s mistake] is that of maintaining that, assuming it would be extraordinary 
if we were often wrong about what we say, it is not competent to request evidence for 
such statements. If we are only usually right, then we are sometimes wrong. But, then, 
it is always competent to request to show that this is not one of those times” (Fodor 
and Katz 65).
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not understand and cannot avow. This of course forms the basis of 
bullying by older and better-settled kids in school, as when a boy in 
the cafeteria line at the junior high in Sacramento asks young Stanley 
(within others students’ earshot), “Are you swaybacked?” (81). Rather 
than hurt by the meaning of this question, Stanley is hurt by being left 
out of its meaning, excluded from the community for whose amuse-
ment it was asked. He knows what it is for a horse to be swayback, 
but, he later asks himself, “What would it mean for a human being 
to be swayback?” (90).
And even more disturbingly, young Stanley’s confusion about words 
also provokes bullying by his father. While working in his father’s 
pawnshop Stanley fails to add tax to a customer’s bill, prompting his 
father into an outburst of rage, “grabbing and shaking the bars of the 
[shop’s] cage, shouting, ‘I told you specifically!’” (122). It emerges 
that Stanley’s father had earlier yelled out the Yiddish word ‘Dus!’, 
his code for the word ‘Tax’. But his father never instructed him in 
that code: young Stanley is blamed for not knowing the words by the 
very person tasked with teaching those words to him.
But Cavell punctuates these stories with the knowledge that things 
get better. For by the end of the book Cavell comes to avow the words 
of, and comes to speak for, others who do not even share his superficial 
accoutrements (such as the band uniform and the ROTC uniform that 
temporarily relieve his anxieties about fitting in at school), and who 
do not even share his generation or race. And here I have in mind 
Cavell’s joining the 1964 Freedom Summer project in Mississippi by 
teaching at Tougaloo College (an experience through which Cavell, 
whose bad ear denied him the defining experience of his biological 
generation, namely World War II, adopted the defining experience 
of a different, younger generation, namely the Civil Rights Movement) 
(429–32). And I also have in mind Cavell’s efforts, together with John 
Rawls, to establish an African American Studies Department at Har-
vard (508–512). I don’t think I could do justice to those extraordinary 
moments in Little Did I Know. But I want to note that in recounting 
his time at Tougaloo College Cavell again raises the issue of speaking 
for others, and he says that the matter is “never an epistemological 
certainty, but something like a moral claim, an arrogation of right” 
(432). And I want to insist that we read this passage together with the 
moment, early in the book, when Cavell finds his Uncle Meyer (the 
once promising musician) reduced to calling the black customers of 
his store by the n-word. Cavell asks, “Did he even know what he was 
saying?” (143). Behind Cavell’s anguish at his Uncle Meyer’s words is 
this rebuke, this arrogation of right: we don’t say that.
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I want to end by suggesting that, in characterizing judgments 
about “what we say” as moral claims, as arrogations of right, Cavell 
is returning in Little Did I Know to his earlier disputes with Benson 
Mates and Fodor and Katz (all of whom thought of these judgments 
as matters of epistemological certainty). And I want to suggest that, 
in doing this, Cavell does not mean to be retracting his earlier view 
that these judgments are matters of self-knowledge. Rather, the lesson 
we should draw is that: always to look for evidence or epistemologi-
cal assurance (“Will others find themselves in what I say?” “Will they 
share my words?”) is to evade the responsibility to make a claim upon 
oneself and upon others. Indeed, much of the drama of Little Did I 
Know consists in Cavell’s putting aside his epistemological anxieties 
about whether he can speak for others and coming to stake himself 
upon the moral claim that he indeed can. Thus in his closing pages 
Cavell writes, “Sometimes you do not know what you have—even in 
a sense do not have it—until you are faced with claiming it” (543). 
Since reading this passage for the first time, I’ve wanted to make my 
own claim, my own arrogation of right. And now here I can: You do 
have it, Stanley. You do speak for us. So thank you for being our voice. 
And thank you for this great book.3
Harvard University
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